The Evolution of U.S. Defense Posture in North and West Africa
Courtesy of www.csis.org
By Alice Hunt Friend and Jamie D. Wise AUGUST 2018
THE ISSUE
A review of U.S. defense posture in North and West Africa since 2012 reveals that changes have been crisis-driven and constrained by AFRICOM’s persistent lack of resourcing, rather than being informed by strategic objectives.
Proposals being considered at the Defense Department to drastically reduce troop levels in Africa may depart from this pattern, while leaving the United States no better prepared to face emerging security threats in the region.
The United States should scale its resourcing to meet its policy objectives, but these objectives should themselves be tailored to realistic threat assessments. hat is the U.S. military presence in North and West Africa, and
how did it evolve? The Defense Department is considering adjustments to its North and West Africa posture in response to a fatal ambush on a U.S.
special operations forces team in Niger last fall.1 Without some historical context, it is difficult to assess if these adjustments reflect substantial changes in U.S. presence, and how they might affect U.S. Africa policy in the future. This brief provides such context.
POSTURE FACTORS IN AFRICA
Defense posture has been described as a mix of “forces, footprint, and agreements.”2 In other words, posture is the sum of the diplomatic permissions to conduct military activities, the physical facilities, and the DoD personnel and military platforms either stationed or temporarily assigned to a defined geographic area. Adjustments to forces can
be easier to make than either installations or access agreements, although the three are often interdependent.
Three major factors affect posture choices: (1) U.S. strategic objectives; (2) reliability of access in terms of diplomatic relations and political stability; and (3) availability
of personnel, assets, and other resources. Officials at
the Pentagon, the State Department, and the relevant combatant commands must periodically assess these factors to ensure a rational fit between posture constraints and policy ambitions.
In the Africa area of operations, conserving resources
is the driving consideration among these three factors. Policymakers and defense planners tend to think of force allocations to Africa as a drain on resources from other theatres rather than as a strategic investment. AFRICOM does not have assigned forces, African hosts generally
are politically sensitive to any U.S. military presence, and the costs of military construction can be high relative to other locations.
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CSIS BRIEFS
As of 2012, AFRICOM had one forward operating site in Djibouti, and a series of access locations across the continent, many of them considered austere, without exclusive-use facilities.3 The Sahara Desert forms a natural and enormous obstacle between much of the population centers in West Africa and locations in the European Command (EUCOM) area of operations, upon which AFRICOM depends heavily
in the event of a crisis. On a regular basis, the command frequently and temporarily borrows assets from other commanders. Personnel assigned to the continent are rotationally, rather than permanently, assigned.
Our review of the evolution of U.S. defense posture and presence in Africa over the past six years revealed a recurring pattern:
Step 1: Crisis is met with ad-hoc U.S. response.
Step 2: Policymakers, operators, and congressional
actors recognize revealed posture gaps in AFRICOM.
Step 3: The United States makes modest adjustments, consistent with the principle of low-cost, light footprint approaches—largely including ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), regional operations, partner capacity-building, and special operations.
This process unfolded in at least five major episodes
over the past six years: the attack on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya; U.S. support to the French intervention in Mali; the brazen actions of Boko Haram; the battle for Sirte
in Libya; and the ambush of U.S. forces in Niger. The U.S. response to date to the 2017 ambush in Niger may signal a potential break from this script. These events, and the posture adjustments that followed, are described below.
CRISIS 1: ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN
FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI (2012)
On September 11, 2012, Libyan militants attacked the
U.S. Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi, Libya. Although the U.S. mobilized surveillance aircraft, two Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoons, and special operations forces from various sites to respond
to the situation, these units were not able to reach the facility in time to prevent the deaths of four U.S. citizens, including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens.4 The ensuing congressional investigations attributed the outcomes
in Benghazi to AFRICOM’s “lack of operational assets,”5 including no nearby forward-operating base, Marine Expeditionary Unit, or in-extremis force to engage in rapid crisis response.6
The Benghazi attacks revealed to a much wider
audience the paucity of defense assets in or dedicated
to North Africa specifically and AFRICOM generally. Under congressional and internal pressure to make commensurate adjustments, DoD worked to increase
its readiness to respond to “high risk, high threat” environments in Africa.7 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta detailed the department’s lessons-learned, which would serve as a blueprint for adjusting U.S. posture.8
First, the United States sought to
expand host nation capacity through train-and-equip assistance.9 Second,
per congressional mandate, the United States deployed 1000 additional marines to the Marine Security Guard Program to enhance diplomatic security.10 Third, DoD provided AFRICOM more capabilities by assigning it Special Purpose Marine Air- Ground Task Forces for Crisis Response and a Commander In-Extremis Force.11 AFRICOM also secured agreements
to share forces with other combatant commands and relocate ISR assets.12
Although the United States adjusted its posture to reduce its vulnerability to another Benghazi-like attack, AFRICOM continued to base primarily from Djibouti and Europe and rely on partnered forces.13 AFRICOM’s then-commander,
Aftermath of attack on U.S. consulate compound in Benghazi.
Gianluigi Geurcia/AFP/GettyImages
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General David Rodriguez, succinctly summarized the approach in 2014: “Our strategic posture and presence are premised on the concept of a tailored, flexible, light footprint that leverages and supports the posture and presence of partners and is supported by expeditionary infrastructure.”14
CRISIS 2: AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB THREATEN MALI, FRANCE
INTERVENES (2012-2013)
In 2012, after a series of defeats at
the hands of a Tuareg rebels, the
Malian military launched a coup that overthrew the government. In the
resulting security vacuum, al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) increased
its control over the northern half of the country and began to expand southward toward the capital, Bamako. In January 2013, the French launched Operation Serval, a robust counterterrorism intervention
U.S. Air Force C17s transporting French soldiers and equipment as part of Operation Serval. Gereard Julien/AFP/Getty Images
in northern Mali, and requested U.S. assistance.15 The United States agreed to provide logistical support in the form of intelligence sharing, aerial refueling, and airlift.16 At the same time, defense officials repeatedly expressed U.S. unwillingness to insert ground forces into Mali.17
The situation in Mali led to calls for supplementing AFRICOM’s limited ISR assets and triggered an expansion in U.S. access and facilities for ISR in the region.18 To support the French mission, the United States began flying unmanned surveillance assets from Niger and sent 200 U.S. troops to the country to facilitate intelligence- sharing.19 In early 2013, reports indicated defense officials were considering expanding the U.S. presence in Niger
by building an airfield in Agadez to base ISR assets and monitor extremist elements in the region.20 Plans for the construction of Niger Air Base 201, the second largest U.S. installation on the continent, materialized in 2014, and the base is set to be operational by 2019.21 As AFRICOM Spokesperson Samantha Reho explained, “The location in Agadez will improve U.S. Africa Command’s capability to facilitate intelligence-sharing that better supports Niger and other partner nations, such as Nigeria, Chad, Mali and other neighbors in the region and will improve our capability to respond to regional security issues.”22
CRISIS 3: THE CHIBOK SCHOOL
KIDNAPPINGS AND BOKO HARAM (2014)
In April of 2014, the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram conducted a mass kidnapping of over 200 Nigerian schoolgirls. The audacity of the attack and the wave of social media activism it inspired prompted another round of congressional inquiry into U.S. military capacity in
West Africa.23 The immediate U.S. response was to send
an 18-member, multidisciplinary team to advise and assist the Nigerian government on locating and rescuing the girls.24 The United States also lent ISR capabilities to the mission, sending 80 troops to Chad in May 2014 to operate unmanned surveillance assets there and share intelligence with the Nigerians.25 Shortly after the deployment, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel insisted “these are not boots on the ground,” signaling U.S. unwillingness to use force or take unilateral action on the continent.26
The global response to #BringBackOurGirls and the increasing lethality of Boko Haram prompted regional governments to take joint action, and the United States offered to help.27 In October 2015, the administration authorized another 300 troops to assist with ISR in Cameroon in the ongoing fight against Boko Haram.28
Nevertheless, by June 2014, AFRICOM had begun diverting its limited ISR assets from the mission in
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Aerial view of Chibok school after Boko Haram’s infamous raid.
Sunday Aghaeze/AFP/Getty Images
Nigeria to other areas on the continent, claiming “ISR is at a premium in Africa.”29 In 2015, AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez acknowledged his command was operating at only 13 percent of its requested ISR capacity and remained dependent on assets from EUCOM.30 As General Rodriguez told the Senate in March 2015, “With our requirements expanding faster than resources are increasing, we are utilizing innovative and creative ways to mitigate capability gaps.”31
CRISIS 4: THE BATTLE FOR SIRTE (2016)
After the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) took control of Sirte in 2015, the United States reportedly stationed small teams of
special operators around Libya to cultivate local partnerships and gather intelligence.32 U.S. involvement intensified after August 1, 2016, when the Government of National Accord (GNA) requested U.S. airstrikes to support its forces in
the battle to control Sirte.33 The United States sent amphibious assault ships carrying Marine-piloted Harrier jets and SuperCobra helicopters to conduct the strikes in what became known as Operation Odyssey Lightning.34 After Libyan forces recaptured Sirte in December 2016, AFRICOM announced the completion of 495 precision airstrikes.35
The U.S. counter-ISIL strategy in Libya has been characterized by ISR support, partner capacity-
building through train-and-equip programs, and advise and assist missions by special forces.36 Although the Pentagon downplays the presence
of any ground forces, officials have indicated “a small number of U.S. forces” have participated in counter-ISIL operations from Libya.37 Authorities from such efforts derive from train-and-equip programs under 10 USC 333 and advise and assist operations under 10 USC 127e.38 Reflecting the by, with, and through approach, DoD Spokesman Peter Cook said the strikes in Sirte were “consistent with our approach to combating ISIL by working with capable and motivated local forces.”39
The Battle of Sirte revealed the tension in U.S. policy between maintaining a small, secretive footprint and sustaining commitment to defeat transnational terror on the continent. Early on, the Pentagon insisted the operation would not consist of “boots on the ground,”40 typifying the emphasis on “low-visibility
operations”41 in Africa. Yet, statements by defense officials throughout Odyssey Lightning also expressed
the enduring nature of the U.S. military commitment
to defeating ISIL and acknowledged Libya would require “strategic patience.”42 Despite their expulsion from Sirte, ISIL members continue to operate in remote inland areas, and concerns about an ISIL resurgence in Libya remain. In late 2016, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford indicated the United States would retain a posture in Africa conducive to a global counter-ISIL
Airstrike on ISIL positions in Sirte.
Fabio Bucciarello/AFP/Getty Images
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strategy.43 Since then, AFRICOM has announced that it has conducted several airstrikes against ISIL targets in Libya—and also against AQIM targets, illustrating the extent to which the campaigns against these two groups overlap geographically.44 At least one anonymous U.S. official source indicated the use of armed UAVs for such strikes.45 The campaign in Sirte, then, appears to have led to a persistent mission involving air assets. This implies a need for ongoing regional access for such platforms.
CRISIS 5: THE AMBUSH IN NIGER (2017)
In October of 2017, a joint U.S.-Nigerien mission was ambushed by militants from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Four U.S. servicemembers were killed, along with four Nigerien soldiers. The event prompted extended
media scrutiny and a series of internal DoD reviews, some of which have been released to the public. An AFRICOM investigation concluded that tactical and operational decisions, not posture gaps, led to the tragedy in Niger,
but also indicated that ground mobility, close air support, and ISR coverage were significant factors in the outcome and revealed a dependency on French and Nigerien quick reaction assets.46
This indirect relationship with resources may partially explain why subsequent debates and decisions over posture adjustments have pointed to both investment and divestment choices. The commander of AFRICOM, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, recently stated the command began to arm drones operating out of Niamey in the wake of the
ambush and has made adjustments to reduce medical evacuation response times.47 While this limited expansion in capabilities reflects the U.S. response to earlier
crises, The New York Times has reported that Secretary of Defense Mattis ordered AFRICOM and Special Operations Command to consider options for cutting the number of special operators rotating to Africa by 50 percent, and that Waldhauser has incorporated SOF cuts into his own plan.48 This may represent a departure from the cycle of crisis response that has thus far defined the U.S. experience
in North and West Africa—or it may indicate a greater reliance on unmanned options, with their accompanying posture requirements.
CONCLUSION
Cumulatively, contingency-generated posture changes in North and West Africa over the past six years have expanded access, inspired a modest growth in facilities construction and use, and increased the number of forces rotating through the region. The question is whether the whole is more strategic than the sum of its parts, or if it is instead
a Frankenstein posture, with functions disconnected from larger policy goals. The by, with, and through approach appears to serve as a compromise for making substantial changes to U.S. posture. AFRICOM has struggled with resource deficiencies since its inception—a condition that constrains U.S. freedom of action in a vast and dynamic theater, as recent incidents reveal. The desire for efficiencies and a low profile has driven the “light footprint” strategy,
at the expense of operational flexibility. Made consciously,
this choice can be justified and objectives adjusted. Stumbled into, it prevents the realization of strategic goals and runs unseen risks that can eventually endanger U.S. personnel.
General Waldhauser’s recent public pronouncements about planned reductions in special operations suggest that, once again, U.S. military presence in Africa is being de-emphasized for
the sake of conserving strategic assets. Secretary Mattis apparently intends to focus these resources on competitions in other theaters. The administration’s plans to withdraw troops signal that it prefers to decrease commitments and operational and tactical risk rather than increase investment in the North and West African theater. It remains to be seen whether buying down operational and tactical risk
Nigerien soldiers undergoing training from U.S. Marines.
Jacob Silberberg/Getty Images
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Building African Security Capacity, Not U.S. Bases
“Our cooperation builds security capacity and can help to reinforce our partners’ willingness to advance our shared interests.”52
– General David Rodriguez, AFRICOM commander, in March 2014
“Even with limited resources or capabilities, Africa Command aggressively works with partners and allies to execute our missions and mitigate risk. Moving forward, we continue to focus our decisive effort on building African partner capacity and will continue to work closely with the international and interagency partners to make small, wise investments which pay huge dividends in building stable and effective governments, the foundation for long-term security in Africa.”53
– General Thomas Waldhauser, AFRICOM commander, in March 2017
“Secretary Mattis has placed a significant emphasis on building and strengthening partnerships to both lessen the demand for U.S. forces and to ensure sustainable indigenous solutions to these problems. In the simplest terms, DoD seeks to work by, with, and through our partners in Africa to find African solutions to African problems.”54
– David Trachtenberg, acting under secretary of Defense for Policy, in December 2017
A History of Low-Cost, Light Footprint Approaches
“In Africa, we are to seek a light footprint and innovative approaches and low-cost approaches to achieving the United States’ security objectives.”49
– General Carter Ham, AFRICOM commander, in January 2013
“AFRICOM recognizes that Africa is a ‘‘low-cost, small- footprint’’ theater and that adequate resources to conduct every desired engagement, exercise, and other military-to- military activities will not be available.”50
– Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in February 2013
“With limited forces and infrastructure, we are working to maximize our adaptability and flexibility to respond effectively to crisis.”51
– General David Rodriguez, AFRICOM commander, in March 2015
increases overall risk from security threats in the region or instead reduces risk overall.
North and West Africa remains a contentious region,
where violent extremism, state fragility, and increasing competition among global state actors continue to affect U.S., allied, and partner interests. The United States must scale its resourcing to meet its policy objectives, but
these objectives must themselves be tailored to realistic threat assessments. Changes to U.S. presence affect U.S. preparation to face the next crisis. When that crisis hits, the cycle may simply resume.
Alice Hunt Friend is a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jamie Wise is an intern with the CSIS International Security Program and an Eminence Fellow at the Ohio State University.
CSIS BRIEFS is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Photo: John Moore/Getty Images
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ENDNOTES
1. Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Prepares to Reduce Troops and Shed Missions in Africa,” The New York Times, August 1, 2018, https://www.ny- times.com/2018/08/01/world/africa/us-withdraw-troops-africa.html/; Carley Petesch, “US Military in Africa Says Changes Made to Protect Troops,” Associ- ated Press, July 30, 2018, https://apnews.com/9a062805a6da46349ef638ad- 4b982a53/US-military-in-Africa-says-changes-made-to-protect-troops.
2. Michael J. Lostumbo, et al., “Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits,” RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA, 2013.
3. Lostumbo, et al., 31.
4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Ter- rorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 together with Additional Views, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, S. Rep. 113-134, https:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt134/pdf/CRPT-113srpt134.pdf.
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Gov- ernmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report on The Terrorist Attack at Benghazi, 112th Cong., 2d sess., 2012, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/ benghazi.pdf.
6. S. Rep. 113-134; U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Majority Interim Report: Benghazi Investi- gation Update, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, https://armedservices.house. gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_upload- ed/20140211-%20HASC%20O%26I%20Interim%20Report%20%28Ac- tions%20-%20Benghazi%29.pdf.
7. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 4435 [How-
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2015] together with Additional Views, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, H. Rep. 113-446, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-con- gress/house-report/446/1?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22beng- hazi%22%5D%7D&r=53; Ben Watson, “After Benghazi, Specialized Crisis Response Teams Are Now the ‘New Normal’,” Defense One, May 20, 2014, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/05/after-benghazi-specialized- crisis-response-teams-are-now-new-normal/84877/.
8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense’s Response to the Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the Find- ings of Its Internal Review Following the Attack: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2013, https://fas. org/irp/congress/2013_hr/benghazi.pdf.
9. The Posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command: Testimo- ny before the House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 1st sess., (2013) (statement of General Carter Ham, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), https:// docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130315/100396/HHRG-113-AS00- Wstate-HamUSAG-20130315.pdf.
10. Alex Tiersky, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives, CRS Report No. R43195 (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R43195.pdf.
11. The Posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 1st sess., (2013) (statement of General Carter Ham, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130315/100396/HHRG-113- AS00-Wstate-HamUSAG-20130315.pdf.
12. U.S. Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 1st sess., (2015) (statement of Gen- eral David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), http://www.africom. mil/media-room/documents/2015.
13. John Vandiver, “How Benghazi forced the military to adapt in Africa,” Stars and Stripes, June 28, 2016, https://www.stripes.com/news/how-beng- hazi-forced-the-military-to-adapt-in-africa-1.416650; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense’s Response to the Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the Findings of Its Internal Review Following the Attack: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2013, S. Hrg. 113-164, https://fas.org/ irp/congress/2013_hr/benghazi.pdf; U.S. Africa Command 2015 Posture State- ment: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 1st sess., (2015) (statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), http://www.africom.mil/media-room/documents/2015.
14. Posture Hearing: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 2d sess., (2014) (statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), http://www.africom.mil/media-room/docu- ments?Page=3.
15. Paul Belkin, France and U.S.-French Relations: In Brief, CRS Report No. R45167 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), https:// fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45167.pdf.
16. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interest and the International Response: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, H. Hrg. 113-3, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg78949/pdf/CHRG- 113hhrg78949.pdf; George Little, “DOD Press Briefing with George Little from the Pentagon,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 29, 2013, http:// archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5184.
17. H. Hrg. 113-3; Leon Panetta and Jose Pedro Aguiar-Branco, “Press Con- ference by Secretary Panetta and Minister Aguiar-Branco in Lisbon, Portu- gal,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 15, 2013, http://archive.defense. gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5176.
18. H. Hrg. 113-3; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report to Accompany S. 2410 [Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015] on To Authorize Appropriations For Fiscal Year 2015 For Military Activities Of The Department Of Defense, For Military Construction, And For Defense Activities Of The Department Of Energy, To Prescribe Military Personnel Strengths For Such Fiscal Year, And For Other Purposes together with Additional Views, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, S. Rep. 113-176, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt176/pdf/ CRPT-113srpt176.pdf.
19. The Posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command: Testi- mony before the House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 1st sess., (2013) (statement of General Carter Ham, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), https://docs. house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130315/100396/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate- HamUSAG-20130315.pdf; David Lewis, “With Training and Partnerships, U.S. Military Treads Lightly in Africa,” Reuters, March 13, 2014, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-africa-usa-security-analysis/with-training-and-partnerships-u- s-military-treads-lightly-in-africa-idUSBREA2C0DL20140313; H. Hrg. 113-3; Letter, President Barack H. Obama to Speaker John A. Boehner, December 13, 2013, Compilation of Presidential Documents, DCPD-201300853, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, https://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300853/pdf/DCPD-201300853.pdf.
20. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. troops arrive in Niger to set up drone base,”
The Washington Post, February 22, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/us-troops-arrive-in-niger-to-set-up-drone- base/2013/02/22/2a3348c0-7d01-11e2-9e84-3fbb5d2ef2a9_story.htm- l?utm_term=.f83e58de25a7; Craig Whitlock, “Drone base in Niger gives U.S. a strategic foothold in West Africa,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2013, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/drone-base-in-niger-gives- us-a-strategic-foothold-in-west-africa/2013/03/21/700ee8d0-9170-11e2-9c4d- 798c073d7ec8_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c74fbab943e1.
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21. Emma Farge, “U.S. building $100 million drone base in central Ni-
ger,” Reuters, September 30, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-niger-security/u-s-building-100-million-drone-base-in-central-niger- idUSKCN12023L; “US builds drone base in Niger, crossroads of extremism fight,” Defense News, April 23, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/un- manned/2018/04/23/us-builds-drone-base-in-niger-crossroads-of-extrem- ism-fight/.
22. “US builds drone base in Niger, crossroads of extremism fight,”
Defense News, April 23, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/un- manned/2018/04/23/us-builds-drone-base-in-niger-crossroads-of-extrem- ism-fight/.
23. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, #BringBackOur- Girls: Addressing the Threat of Boko Haram: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-113shrg94293/pdf/CHRG-113shrg94293.pdf.
24. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Nigeria’s 2015 Elections and the Boko Haram Crisis, CRS Report No. R43881 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43881.pdf; Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram,” The White House, October 14, 2014, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us- efforts-assist-nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko-.
25. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions, CRS Report No. R43558 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf; Ernesto Londono, “U.S. deploys 80 troops to Chad to help find kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/us-deploys-80-military-personnel-to-chad/2014/05/21/ edd7d21a-e11d-11e3-810f-764fe508b82d_story.html?utm_ter- m=.20d7de0859a6; Chuck Hagel, “Secretary Of Defense Chuck Hagel Is Interviewed On PBS’s “Charlie Rose Show”,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 22, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?Tran- scriptID=5436.
26. Chuck Hagel, “Secretary Of Defense Chuck Hagel Is Interviewed On PBS’s ‘Charlie Rose Show’,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 22, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5436.
27. Blanchard (2015); “Fact Sheet” (2014); Office of the Spokesper- son, “United States Support to Counter Boko Haram,” U.S. Department of State, February 11, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2016/02/252399.htm.
28. Blanchard (2016)
29. John Kirby, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby
in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 27, 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455; Dan De Luce and Siobhan O’Grady, “U.S. to Boost Military Aid to Nigeria
for Boko Haram Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 16, 2015, https://foreignpolicy. com/2015/07/16/u-s-to-boost-military-aid-to-nigeria-for-boko-haram-fight/.
30. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing To Receive Testimony On U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command And U.S. Special Op- erations Command Programs And Budget In Review Of The Defense Authorization Request For Fiscal Year 2016 And The Future Years Defense Program, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015, S. Hrg. 114-204, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/15-36%20-%203-26-15.pdf.
31. United States Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement: Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 1st sess., (2015) (statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), https://www. armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez_03-26-15.pdf.
32. Missy Ryan, “U.S. establishes Libyan outposts with eye toward offensive against Islamic State,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-estab- lishes-libyan-outposts-with-eye-toward-offensive-against-islamic-
state/2016/05/12/11195d32-183c-11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.htm- l?utm_term=.77a593fef445; Andrew Tilghman, “US Conducts New Round of Airstrikes Against ISIS in Libya,” Defense News, August 1, 2016, https://www. defensenews.com/breaking-news/2016/08/01/us-conducts-new-round-of- airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya/; Christopher M. Blanchard, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, CRS Report No. RL33142 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf.
33. Peter Cook, “Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on
US Air Strike in Libya,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 1, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Arti- cle/881794/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-us-air- strike-in-libya/.
34. Tilghman (2016); Courtney Mabeus, “USS Wasp sailors, Marines, play role in U.S. airstrikes against Islamic State group in Libya,” The Virginian-Pilot, August 2, 2016, https://pilotonline.com/news/mili- tary/local/uss-wasp-sailors-marines-play-role-in-u-s-airstrikes/arti- cle_38bdb44b-1094-5e96-864d-ae3c35183c8c.html.
35. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, “AFRICOM concludes Operation Odyssey Lightning,” U.S. Africa Command, December 20, 2016, http://www. africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/28564/africom-concludes-opera- tion-odyssey-lightning.
36. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Terrorism in North Africa: An Examination of the Threat: Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, H. Hrg. 115-11, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg26909/pdf/CHRG- 115hhrg26909.pdf; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, H. Hrg. 115-103, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg27758/pdf/CHRG- 115hhrg27758.pdf.
37. Cook, August 1, 2016.
38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114- 328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/ PLAW-114publ328.pdf.
39. Peter Cook, “Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on
US Air Strike in Libya,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 1, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Arti- cle/881794/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-us-air- strike-in-libya/.
40. Peter Cook, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 1, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Tran- script-View/Article/882676/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pen- tagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in/.
41. Ryan (2016).
42. Blanchard (2018); Peter Cook, “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Press Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 25, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/ Transcript-View/Article/927030/department-of-defense-press-briefing-with- press-secretary-peter-cook-in-the-pre/; Ash Carter and Michael Fallon, “Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Secretary Michael Fallon,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 7, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/ Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/937142/joint-press-conference-by-sec- retary-carter-and-secretary-michael-fallon/; Ash Carter, “Media Availability with Secretary Carter in Aviano, Italy,” U.S. Department of Defense, Decem- ber 13, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/ Article/1028979/media-availability-with-secretary-carter-in-aviano-ita-
ly/; Peter Cook, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 19, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/ Transcript-View/Article/1033978/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by- pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in/.
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43. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Libya: Five Years After Ghadafi: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 114th Cong., 2d sess., 2016, H. Hrg. 114-238, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/CHRG-114hhrg22863/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg22863.pdf; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Libya’s Terrorist Descent: Causes and Solutions: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 114th Cong., 2d sess., 2016, H. Hrg. 114-225, https://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg21676/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg21676.pdf; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. National Security Challenges and Ongoing Military Operations, 114th Cong., 2d sess., 2016, S. Hrg. 114-687, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg26841/pdf/ CHRG-114shrg26841.pdf.
44. United States Africa Command, “U.S. Conducts Precision Strike in Libya,” June 6, 2018, https://pilotonline.com/news/military/local/uss-wasp-sailors- marines-play-role-in-u-s-airstrikes/article_38bdb44b-1094-5e96-864d-ae- 3c35183c8c.html; United States Africa Command, “U.S. Conducts Precision Strike in Libya,” June 13, 2018, https://www.africom.mil/media-room/press- release/30917/u-s-conducts-precision-strike-in-libya.
45. Idrees Ali, “U.S. Air Strikes Kill 17 Islamic State Militants in Libya: U.S. Military,” Reuters, September 24, 2017 https://www.reuters.com/article/us- usa-libya-strike/u-s-air-strikes-kill-17-islamic-state-militants-in-libya-u-s- military-idUSKCN1BZ0P5.
46. See Alice Hunt Friend, “Critical Questions: DoD’s Report on the Inves- tigation into the 2017 Ambush in Niger,” CSIS, May 15, 2018, https://www. csis.org/analysis/dods-report-investigation-2017-ambush-niger.
47. Petesch (2018).
48. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon May Cut Commando Forces in Africa in Major Military Review,” The New York Times, June 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/africa/commandos-africa-piv- ot-major-powers.html; Cooper and Schmitt (2018).
49. Carter Ham, “Presentation on the Role and Mission of United States Africa Command,” (presentation, Howard University, Washington DC, January 24, 2013), http://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/10243/ transcript-presentation-on-the-role-and-mission-of.
50. S. Hrg. 113-164.
51. U.S. Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 1st sess., (2015) (statement of Gen- eral David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), http://www.africom. mil/media-room/documents/2015.
52. Posture Hearing: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 2d sess., (2014) (statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander U.S. AFRICOM), http://www.africom.mil/media-room/docu- ments?Page=3.
53. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Central Command and United States Africa Com- mand, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/17-18_03-09-17.pdf.
54. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, H. Hrg. 115-103, https://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg27758/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg27758.pdf.
